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Haber: The Cyber Civil War

THE CYBER CIVIL WAR
EldarHaber*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Suppose that someone hacked into your email account, stole the
content of your emails, and posted them online. All of your email
correspondence is now searchable in every search engine. Whomever
you mentioned in any of your emails can easily find those emails by a
quick search of his or her name. Most of us are terrified by such a
scenario. We might not only lose and alienate our family, friends, and
colleagues, but there could also be various other economic, social, and
legal implications resulting from such information disclosure.' This
scenario has recently become non-fictional. On November 24, 2014, a
group of hackers identified as the "Guardians of Peace" launched a
cyber-attack 2 on Sony Pictures Entertainment ("Sony"), obtaining and
releasing personally identifiable information of the company's
employees and their dependents--emails between employees,
information about executive salaries, copies of unreleased Sony films,
3
and other information--commonly referred to as "the Sony Hack". The
motivation behind the Sony Hack was linked to a new, pre-released
Sony movie entitled "The Interview," which satirically presented North
Korea's leader, Kim Jong-un.4 Many U.S. government authorities
attributed the Sony Hack to North Korea, but it is still unclear whether it
was a geopolitical act of retaliation.5
Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Haifa Center for Law & Technology and Cyber Forum,
Faculty of Law, Haifa University. I wish to thank Deborah Housen Couriel, Amnon Reichman, and
Tal Zarsky for their insightful suggestions and comments. This research was funded by the Israeli
Ministry of Science, Technology and Space (MOST).
1. See infra text accompanying notes 2-23.
2. This Article uses the phrases "cyber-attack" and "cyber-warfare" to refer to activities
centered on the use of a computer system or computer network.
*

3.

Kim Zetter, Sony Got Hacked Hard: What We Know and Don't Know So Far, WIRED

(Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/12/sony-hack-what-we-know.
4. See THE INTERVIEW (Columbia Pictures 2014); Zetter, supranote 3.
5.

See Choe Sang-Hun, North Korea Denies Role in Sony Pictures Hacking, N.Y. TtAES,
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The Sony Hack raises many legal questions of various aspects:
Should the U.S. government protect private companies and/or their
employees from cyber-warfare? Should the government respond to such
attacks, and if so, how? And furthermore, what are the legal mechanisms
available to Sony to enforce its rights? The Sony Hack also
demonstrated and emphasized how individuals could launch an attack
entirely through electronic warfare that could highly affect other
individuals: a digital civil war through cyber means.
Civilians are not new to cyber-warfare. Some individuals are
hackers. Others are targets. There is nothing new about that. What could
gradually be changing are the potential non-monetary risks to civilians
due to cyber-attacks on third parties. We should no longer only fear that
someone might steal our credit card numbers, but rather, we must be
concerned for our personal information, generally. Vast amounts of endusers' information is stored online and could one day be released
through a cyber-attack, such'as in the Sony Hack.6 Emails, search
queries, credit card numbers, purchase histories, and basically anything
else we do online could be posted for everyone to search and freely
view.7 How do U.S. laws cope with this new information threat? Not
well. Current legal measures are insufficient to deal with such new
threats.8 When hacks occur, even if the law enables the civilian to bring
charges against the hacker, the company, the publisher, or the search
Dec. 7, 2014, at B2; Lori Grisham, Timeline: North Korea and the Sony Pictures Hack, USA
TODAY (Jan. 5, 2015, 12:36 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2014/12/18/
sony-hack-timeline-interview-north-korea/20601645.
6. See Scott J. Shackelford & Richard B. Andres, State Responsibilityfor Cyber Attacks:
Competing Standardsfor a Growing Problem, 42 GEO. J. INT'L L. 971, 976-77 (2011); Eugene E.
Hutchinson, Note, Keeping Your Personal Information Personal: Trouble for the Modern
Consumer, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1149, 1151-55, 1162-63 (2015) (discussing online data collection
practices and the frequency of data breaches).
7. See, e.g., John E. Dunn, Google Web History Vulnerable to Firesheep Hack, PC WORLD
(Sept. 10, 2011, 11:19 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/239826/google web history_
vulnerable-to firesheep hack.html (discussing a hacking tool that can be used to access victim's
Google web history); Dan Goodin, Ashley Madison Hack Is Not Only Real, It's Worse Than We
Thought, ARSTECHNICA (Aug. 19, 2015), http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/08/ashley-madisonhack-is-not-only-real-its-worse-than-we-thought (discussing the hack of the website Ashley
Madison, which resulted in the publication of intimate data and personal information including
credit card data, transaction history, and email addresses for more than 30 million accounts); Laurie
Segall, Hackers Expose Ashley Madison CEO's Emails, CNNMONEY (Aug. 20, 2015),
http:/money.cnn.com/2015/08/20/technology/ashley-madison-hack-emails (discussing the hack of
emails).
8. See Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Mitigative Counterstriking: Self-Defense and
Deterence in Cyberspace, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 431,488-89 (2012); Valerie Richardson, Hacking
Victims Have Few Options as FirstAmendment Protects Media Disclosures, WASH. TIMES, (Dec.
24, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/dec/24/hacking-first-amendment-openprivate-email-to-publ/?page=all.
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engines that link to the misappropriated information, it will not cease the
dissemination of this information. The answer could possibly emerge
from a relatively new legal framework that has developed in the
European Union ("EU"), known as the "right to be forgotten." 9
In the last few years, the EU discussed the right to be forgotten as
part of a new General Data Protection Regulation ("GDPR") regime."0 It
refers to "the right of individuals to have their data no longer processed
and deleted when they are no longer needed for legitimate purposes." 1
Narrowly, it is a right to prevent people from knowing something about
others-a right to control what the Internet knows, essentially. But even
prior to legislative enactment, the spirit of the right to be forgotten reigns
over EU courts decisions due to the European Data Protection
Directive. 2 On May 13, 2014, the Court of Justice of the EU held that
search engine operators are responsible for their processing of personal
data appearing on web pages published by third parties.' 3 Thus, the right
to be forgotten is alive and kicking in Europe under the current version
of the European Data Protection Directive.
The Sony Hack should raise the possibility of implementing a right
to be forgotten anywhere. If indeed we are all becoming targets of cyberattacks, which could lead to the revelation of personal information, then
free speech might take a step back, as people will become more hesitant
to share their information. But enforcing the right to be forgotten is
problematic. It is complex, costly, creates higher barriers of market
entry, leads to possible manipulation and fragmentation of search results,
and is not necessarily applicable in many situations. 4 But mainly, it
leads to undesired levels of Internet censorship, also endangering free
speech. 5 Moreover, it does not solve the most important problem, as it
mostly deals with personal information posted online which is outdated
or no longer relevant. 6 This calls for a different solution that grants a
right to remove non-newsworthy content that was unlawfully obtained.
Under this proposal, each data holder will be obliged to implement

9. See infra Part V.A.
10. See infra Part V.A.
11. European Commission, A Comprehensive Approach on PersonalData Protection in the
European Union, at 8, COM (2010) 609 final (Apr. 11, 2010).
12. Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on
the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 42 [hereinafter Directive 95/461EC].
13. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espafiola de Proteccion de Datos (AEPD),
2014 EUR-Lex CELEX 62012CJO131 I 21-41 (May 13, 2014).
14. See infra notes 213-18 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
93-94.
16. Google Spain SL, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX 62012CJ0131
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technological measures to identify information (for example, a digital
fingerprint). If someone illegally obtained your non-newsworthy
information, then you can file a complaint with law enforcement
agencies, and request the removal of the content and any connecting
links. Under a court order, Online Service Providers ("OSPs") will be
required to delete such information and/or links to it. While this is not a
perfect solution, it would be the best enforceable mechanism for
removing online content that was stolen through a cyber-attack.
This Article examines the new informational threat to civilians in
cyberspace and proposes a modest solution. It proceeds as follows: Part
II examines the two traditional roles individuals play in cyberspaceattackers and potential targets.' 7 Part III describes new threats of cyberwarfare to civilians-the dissemination of personal data online." Part IV
analyzes the current legal measures that civilians could use.' 9 Part IV
also argues that current legal measures are insufficient in aiding civilians
to face the new informational threat.2" Part V discusses the need for a
forgetful Internet by introducing and discussing the EU's right to be
forgotten.2 ' While the right to be forgotten, as accepted in the EU, is
inadequate and should not be adopted in the United States in its current
state, a newly proposed framework, which could aid civilians to better
deal with the new cyber threat, is offered in this Article.22 Finally, Part
VI summarizes the discussion and raises further concerns about the
future of the Internet.23
II.

THE ROLE OF CIVILIANS IN CYBER-WARFARE

There are three main ways states are vulnerable to cyber-attacks.24
The first is governmental and military. Much like the kinetic world,
states could encounter a cyber-attack on their governmental and military
infrastructures. 25 The second is industrial. Perhaps differently from the
kinetic world, private companies could be attacked by other entities,

17. See infra Part I.
18. See infra Part Hl.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Part V.
22. See infra Part V.
23. See infra Part VI.
24. See George R. Lucas, Jr., Privacy,Anonymity, and Cyber Security, 5 AMSTERDAM L.F.,
Spring 2013, at 107, 107 (2013).
25. See id. at 108; Gordon Lubold & Damian Paletta, Pentagon Sizing Up Email Hack of Its
Brass, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 7, 2015, 7:16 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/pentagon-sizing-upemail-hack-of-its-brass-1438989404 (reporting email hack of Pentagon officials).
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whether by other nations, competitors, or even individuals. 26 The third
relates to individuals. Individuals are involved in cyber-attacks as both
attackers and potential direct targets.2 7
There is almost nothing new about the first two types of cyberwarfare. States have used cyber-attacks against other states, 28 and
perhaps against companies. 29 Companies are many times attacked by
hackers.3" Along the way, individuals have entered the digital battlefield.
Some individuals play the role of attackers, whether actively or
passively, and some are targets.3 But the role of the civilian in cyberwarfare, and the nature of the attacks against them, might currently be
changing. At first, civilians were usually a target of cyber-crimes, either
by serving as a proxy in a cyber-attack, usually through a Distributed
Denial of Service ("DDoS") or when someone obtained their personal
information, such as passwords or credit card numbers.32 Today,
civilians could become victims of cyber-attacks and cyber-warfare
against the government, the industry, or even against themselves as
individuals.3 3 Thus, civilians should now fear cyber-attacks in a different
manner-not only can their personal computer be attacked, hacked,
and/or hijacked, but they could also suffer devastating harm from attacks
on third parties.34 It is no longer merely fear of monetary implications;
26. See RILEY WATERS, HERITAGE FOUND. No. 4289, ISSUE BRIEF: CYBER ATTACKS ON U.S.
COMPANIES IN 2014, at 2-4 (2014), http://thf media.s3.amazonaws.com/2014/pdf/IB4289.pdf
(listing private company hacks in 2014 by individuals, as well as state actors); Kim Zetter, Ashley
Madison Leak Reveals its Ex-CTO Hacked Competing Site, WIRED (Aug. 24, 2015,
6:06 PM) http://www.wired.com/2015/08/ashley-madison-leak-reveals-ex-cto-hacked-competingsite (reporting that a former Ashley Madison executive hacked a competing website).
27. See infra Part IL.A-B.
28. See Nate Anderson, Confirmed: US and Israel Created Stuxnet, Lost Control of It,
ARSTECHNICA (June 1, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/06/confirmed-usisrael-created-stuxnet-lost-control-of-it.
29. The Sony Hack represents such an example. U.S. government officials stated on various
accounts that the North Korean government is behind the attack. See Grisham, supra note 5.
However, it is still unclear whether these accusations are correct. See Kim Zetter, The Evidence
That North Korea Hacked Sony Is Flimsy, WIRED (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/12/
evidence-of-north-korea-hack-is-thin.
30. See WATERS, supranote 26.
31. See infra Part I.A-B.
32. See infra notes 50-56 and accompanying text; Part III.
33. There could be a difference between the levels of threats to civilians online. For example,
civilians who do not engage, or engage less, in online activities are statistically less vulnerable than
civilians who are more active online. Moreover, civilians from traditionally disadvantaged classes,
such as women and people of color, could be more subject to some forms of cyber-attacks due to
"anonymous mobs," which come together to victimize and subjugate vulnerable people. See
generally Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REv. 61 (2009).
34. For example, the hack of the Ashley Madison website revealed the first and last names of
users, partial credit card data, phone numbers, transaction history, email addresses, PayPal account
information, and other forms of personal information for more than 30 million users. See Goodin,
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attacks on third parties could potentially reveal personal data and
jeopardize their privacy rights and online liberties."
Thus, although civilians have been a part of cyber-warfare for a
long time, they only played a relatively small role until recently.3 6 This
is about to change. The vulnerability of civilians could play an important
role in future cyber-warfare. Furthermore, if civilians' role as targets
continues to increase, it could create a global cyber civil war. This fear is
still premature, however. Before analyzing the new possible role of
civilians in cyber-warfare, and the possibility of such a cyber civil war, a
short, but nonetheless important, taxonomy must take place. This Part
outlines the different roles of individuals in cyber-warfare and examines
their new role as victims.37
A. Individuals as Attackers
Individuals engage in cyber-warfare by way of two main methods:
as hackers or as proxies.38 Many individuals are hackers. They operate
either by themselves or through a group of people.3 9 While the result of
cyber-attacks might be similar in some cases, there are various types of
hackers with various motives.4" Some hackers are hired by the
government, 41 some by companies,42 and others act alone. 43 In the
category of potential attackers, there are "Black Hat Hackers," who are

supra note 7. Data about the intimate details of individuals was also exposed, such as clandestine
affairs and sexual predilections. See id.
35. See id.
36. See infra Part II.B.
37. See infra Part I.A-B.
38. For more on the increasing role of civilians in cyber-warfare, see generally Logan Liles,
The Civilian Cyber Battlefield: Non-State Cyber Operators' Status Under the Law of Armed
Conflict, 39 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1091 (2014).
39. For examples of hacker groups and individual hackers, see Abhishek Awasthi,
Top Ten Most Infamous Hackers of All Time, TECHWORM (Sept. 15, 2015),
http://www.techworm.net/2015/09/top-ten-most-infamous-hackers-of-all-time.html; Elise Viebeck,
Three Hacking Groups You Need to Know, HILL (Feb. 23, 2015, 6:11 PM),
http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/233552-three-hacking-groups-you-need-to-know.
40. Generally, there are six primary categories: addiction, curiosity, boredom, power,
recognition, and politics. See Q. Campbell & David M. Kennedy, The Psychology of Computer
Criminals, in COMPUTER SECURITY HANDBOOK 12"2 (Seymour Bosworth et al. eds., 6th ed. 2014).
41. Shane Huang, Proposing a Self-Help Privilegefor Victims of Cyber Attacks, 82 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 1229, 1234 (2014) (arguing that the Chinese government sponsored hackers to
conduct cyber-attacks).
42. "Spy Hackers" are hackers hired by corporations to infiltrate the competition and steal
trade secrets. See Robert Siciliano, 7 Types of Hacker Motivations, MCAFEE (Mar. 16, 2011),
(exploring seven
http:/iblogs.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/7-types-of-hacker-motivations
types of hackers and dividing them into "good" and "bad" guys).
43. Id.
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usually simply referred to as "hackers."' These hackers usually break
into networks or computers, or create computer viruses for destructive
purposes or financial gain.4 5 They are individuals with purely personal or
criminal motives. 6 The second type of attacker is a "Hacktivist" '4 motivated mostly by politics, religion, or to expose wrongdoing in a
strategy to exercise civil disobedience.4 8 Third, and finally, there are
attackers that merely "hack back," where they are hacking in reaction to
other hackers.49
Another form of cyber-attack occurs through "hijacking."5 In this
form of attack, individuals attack without realizing it.5 The hacker
creates a network of "botnets" by infecting a large amount of
computers.52 These "zombie" computers can be used to send spain, steal
passwords or valuable financial information, or display ads. 3 But the
botnet operator can also use the zombie computers for cyber-attacks . 4 It
will usually occur through a DDoS attack, where a virus compromises
end-users' computers and the attacker hijacks their computers to flood a
target with too much data for it to handle.5 Therefore, the individual's
computer could actually engage in a cyber-attack without his knowledge.
B. Individuals as Targets
The digital environment, much like the kinetic world, has its share
of crime. Individuals are often victims of various cyber-crime activities,
such as, identity theft and identity fraud. 6 There are vast amounts of
online frauds that often succeed.57 Most of these attacks are directed
44. These hackers are sometimes referred to as "crackers." See id.
45. Id.
46. See George O'Malley, Hacktivism: Cyber Activism or Cyber Crime?, 16 TRINITY C. L.
REv. 137, 140 (2013).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49.

See Paul Rosenzweig, International Law and Private Actor Active Cyber Defensive

Measures, 50 STAN. J. INT'L L. 103 (2014) (defining and describing "back hacks").
50. Josh Wepman, Definition of Computer Hiack, EHow, http://www.ehow.com/
about_6465909_definition-computer-hijack.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
51. See, e.g., Huang, supranote 41, at 1235-36.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id.For more on DDoS attacks and legal responsibility, see generally Lilian Edwards,
Dawn of the Death of DistributedDenial of Service: How to Kill Zombies, 24 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 23 (2006).
56. See generally JOHN Q. NEWMAN, IDENTITY THEFT: THE CYBERCRIME OF THE

MILLENNIUM (1999) (describing and providing examples of various methods of identity theft).
57. See Common FraudSchemes, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/scams-safety/fraud/internetfraud
(last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
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against civilians.58 These are typically the classic (mostly) monetary
attacks.59 Think of it as robbery in the digital age. Lately, a new form of
indirect cyber-attack through third parties has emerged, which could be
no less harmful for civilians than the classic direct monetary attacks.60
There are two main forms of indirect cyber-attacks on civilians:
attacks on critical infrastructure 6' and attacks targeted at obtaining
personal data.62 To illustrate the first, consider a cyber-attack that shuts
down an electrical grid, causing millions of Americans to live without
electricity for a few days. 63 Apart from experiencing major
inconvenience, those individuals might be harmed physically,
emotionally, and financially, as a lack of electricity could affect various
aspects of their lives. They might not be able to purchase food or
medicine, they could suffer financial losses, or they may experience
countless other consequences. This illustrates the need to protect
critical infrastructure from any malfunction or attack, including
through digital means. 61
The second form of indirect attacks target data, both for monetary
and non-monetary purposes.65 Usually, attackers will launch the attack
on either governmental agents or commercial entities that possess data
about civilians.66 Monetary reasons are behind the "classic" attacks,67
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See infra notes 63-75 and accompanying text.
61. See generally Zhen Zhang, Cybersecurity Policyfor the ElectricitySector: The FirstStep
to ProtectingOur CriticalInfrastructurefrom Cyber Threats, 19 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 319 (2013)
(discussing cybersecurity threats that compromise critical infrastructure). Critical infrastructure in
the United States is defined as follows: "[Slystems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital
to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a
debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any
combination of those matters." 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e) (2012).
62. See generally WATERS, supra note 26 (listing cyber-attacks on U.S. companies in 2014
that predominately focused on the theft of customer's personal data).
63. In August 2003, an electrical blackout affected millions of people across several U.S.
states. Joe D. Whitley et al., Homeland Security, Law, and Policy Through the Lens of Critical
Infrastructure and Key Asset Protection, 47 JURIMETRICS 259, 269 (2007). Transportation,
emergency services, information, and telecommunications began to fail. See id.
64. For more on the importance of protecting critical infrastructure, see, for example, JOHN D.
MOTEFF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30153, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES: BACKGROUND, POLICY,

AND IMPLEMENTATION 1-2, 2 n.6 (2014), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL30153.pdf, and
Zhang, supra note 61, at 322-23.
65. See WATERS, supranote 26, at 1-5; Zetter, supra note 3.
66. See Huang, supra note 41, at 1233-34. It is obvious that hackers can obtain information
through a direct attack on a home computer. However, it is far more efficient to hack into a data
center and acquire data on multiple users than to hack each user separately. For example, as
discussed, the hack of the website Ashley Madison resulted in the theft of personal information for
over 30 million users. See Goodin, supranote 7.
67. For example, a cyber-attack on Target caused leakage of 40 million credit card numbers.
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but non-monetary reasons are also part of the game.68 For example, if
someone hacks into Google, he might steal your entire search history
and any data stored on Google drives, as well as your email
correspondence through your G-mail account.
The target in critical infrastructure attacks is not the civilian.69
Although individuals are potentially harmed,' attacks against critical
infrastructure are usually a form of national cyber-warfare. 70 Sony was
likely the target more so than its employees were, and thus it was not
necessarily much different from a critical infrastructure attack. 7' The
difference between the two forms of attack lies mainly within the
outcome. Indeed, both incidents could be harmful for civilians, but the
nature of the harm is different.72 In critical infrastructure attacks, the fear
is mostly physical harm.73 In the second form of attack, the fear is both
financial and personal.7 4 But, the nature of the second form of attack is
also changing.
III.

THE NEW THREAT: PERSONAL INFORMATION

The government holds enormous amounts of information on its
citizens (and likely on non-citizens, as well).75 Specifically,
governmental agencies hold taxation information, social security
numbers, health records, and other sensitive data.76 We recently learned
from Edward Snowden's revelations that the government knows even
more about us than we thought.77 When we discovered that George
See Michael Riley et al., Missed Alarms and 40 Million Stolen Credit CardNumbers: How Target
Blew It, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-03-13/targetmissed-alarms-in-epic-hack-of-credit-card-data.
68. Hackers are often motivated by religious or political beliefs and attempt to create fear and
chaos, while others attack with military objectives, among other reasons. See Siciliano, supra note
42.
69. See Shackelford & Andres, supra note 6, at 978-80.
70. See id. at 978-80, 1004-05.
71. See Zetter, supranote 3.
72. See Shackelford & Andres, supra note 6, at 1004-05.
73. See id. at 978-80.
74. See Huang, supra note 41, at 1235-36.
75. See Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional
Considerations,37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 756, 766-82 (2014) (discussing methods of collection
information from both citizens and non-citizens of the United States by the government and the type
of information collected).
76. See Fred H. Cate, Government DataMining: The Needfor a Legal Framework,43 HARv.
CR-C.L. L. REv. 435,439-51 (2008).
77. Edward Snowden, a former employee of the National Security Agency ("NSA") and
perhaps the most famous whistleblower thus far, revealed two main NSA "internal" programs. The
first program was a bulk collection of call record information "metadata" pursuant to orders issued
by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC"). Peter Marhulies, The NSA in Global
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Orwell's "Big Brother" prognostications were non-fictional, we were
scared.78 Now, we should be terrified. The government stores massive
amounts of information that could one day be hacked, stolen, and
published by anyone. 79
The same concern applies to commercial entities. Many
commercial entities store vast amounts of information gathered from, or
about, their users.8" Various types of OSPs know our search queries, the
content of our emails, and have access to our files on the Cloud.81 We
allow them to obtain and use such information in exchange for their
services.8" Consider Google and its possession of data,83 and every
mobile application you have ever installed.84 Can you recall what you
agreed to when accepting the terms of use? Probably not. You likely did
not even read the terms, as most people do not.85 But you likely granted
permission for the owners to listen through your microphone, trace your
location, read through your emails, and take photos from your device.86

Perspective: Surveillance, Human Rights, and International Counterterrorism,82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2137, 2140-41 (2012). This gathering of information is supposedly issued under section 215 of
the USA Patriot Act. 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012); Marhulies, supra, at 2140-41. The second program
was gathering electronic communications using two methods: PRISM and upstream collection. See
Marhulies, supra, at 2140-41. Under PRISM, the NSA targets the contents of communications of
non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located abroad and where such surveillance will result
in acquiring foreign intelligence information. See id. PRISM is supposedly operated pursuant to
section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"). 50 U.S.C. § 188 1a (2012); see
Marhulies, supra, at 2140-41. Under upstream collection, the NSA gathers electronic
communications, including metadata and content, of foreign targets overseas whose
communications flow through American networks, supposedly pursuant to section 702 of FISA and
Executive Order 12333. See Exec. Order No. 12333, 40 Fed. Reg. 235 (Dec. 4, 1981), as amended
by Executive Order 13284 (Jan. 23, 2003), and by Executive Order 13355 (Aug. 27, 2004), and
further amended by Executive Order 13470 (July 30, 2008); Marhulies, supra, at 2141-42. For more
on NSA programs, see Donohue, supra note 75, at 770-76.
78. See generally GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (First Plume Printing 1949); Lewis Beale, We're
Living '1984' Today, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/03/opinion/beale-1984-now (last updated
Aug. 3, 2013, 9:22 AM).
79. See Cate, supranote 76, at 439-51.
80. See Hutchinson, supra note 6, at 1151-55.
81. Id. at 1152.
82. Id.
83. Id
84. See Neil McAllister, How Many Mobile Apps Collect Data on Users? Oh... Nearly All
of Them, REGISTER (Feb. 21, 2014, 2:28 PM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/02/21/
appthorityappprivacystudy.
85. One study suggests that reading all of the privacy policies you encounter would require
you to take a month off from work each year. See Mike Masnick, To Read All of the Privacy
Policies You Encounter, You 'd Need to Take a Month Offfrom Work Each Year, TECHDIRT (Apr.
23, 2012, 7:04 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120420/10560418585/to-read-all-privacypolicies-you-encounter-youd-need-to-take-month-off-work-each-year.shtml.
86. See Nina Pineda, Popular Apps that Spy on You, WABC-TV (Dec. .22, 2014),
http://7online.com/technology/popular-apps-that-spy-on-you/447016.
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It is scary enough that these companies might use your information
themselves or sell it for targeted marketing, but even more terrifying is
that, if these companies are hacked, your information could be released
to the public online.8 7
Lately, there have been some incidents where hacking led to the
release of personal information, in addition to the theft of "traditional"
sensitive information, such as usernames, passwords, and credit card
details usually obtained through phishing.88 Through a cyber-attack on
Apple's cloud services suite, iCloud,89 hackers stole nude photos of
celebrities and released them online.9" This incident emphasized how
anything we store online or even on our mobile devices could be
breached and published one day. Bear in mind that famous individuals
should be treated a bit differently here from non-famous individuals.
They enjoy less privacy than the common citizen in both the kinetic and
digital worlds. Although, normatively, we all deserve similar liberties,
fame has its price. The Sony Hack, however, showed that anonymity is
not a safeguard. Civilians could be less resilient to cyber-attacks than
they once were.
Cyber security is hardly a new issue. Companies are, or at least
should be, well aware that any online website or database could be
breached, and thus needs protection. The level of protection required
varies between different online websites, depending mainly on their risk
assessment of the probability of hacking, the nature of infornation they
possess, and their financial resources.9" It is not much different from the
kinetic world. Banks and jewelry stores will probably invest in physical
security more than a local bookstore. Setting aside insurance
requirements, they are all at risk of burglary, but at different levels and
with different potential losses. Cyberspace is not exactly synonymous
with the kinetic world. An attack stealing customers' information could

87. See Hutchinson, supra note 6, at 1152-53, 1162-65.
88. For a description of "phishing," see Online Fraud: Phishing, NORTON,
http://us.norton.com/cybercrime-phishing (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
89. iCloud is a storage service created by Apple, Inc. iCloud allows users to connect Apple
products to each other, ensuring successful backup of their important information, such as
documents, photos, notes, and contacts. iCloud is accessible from iPhones, iPads, iPod Touches,
Mac computers, or any computer browser. See iCloud: What is iCloud?, APPLE,
(last visited Nov. 22,
https://support.apple.com/kb/PH2608?locale-en_US&viewlocale=enUS
2015).
90. See David Raven & Jess Wilson, Jennifer Lawrence Leaked Nude Photos: Apple
Launches Investigation into Hacking of iCloud, MIRROR, http://www.mirror.co.uk/3am/celebritynews/jennifer-lawrence-leaked-nude-photos-4155078 (last updated Sept. 23, 2014, 10:24 AM).
91. See generally Cyber Security Planning Guide, FED. COMM. COMMISSION,
https://transition.fcc.gov/cyber/cyberplanner.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
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be harmful for the website owner, but he does not necessarily suffer
direct loses comparable to the jewelry store owner.92
Online protection for end-users is also hardly new. 3 We are all
constantly reminded to protect ourselves online, either by being wary of
opening emails that can contain viruses, raising the level of security of
our personal computers by implementing anti-virus software, or
choosing sophisticated passwords and keeping them secure.94 The Sony
Hack did not change anything in that area. What changed is our
awareness of the rising threat of the visibility of our personal
information due to cyber-attacks on third parties. Even if we are
cautionary online, acquire the best software, and secure our passwords,
our information might be stolen from other sources. These sources might
also act properly to secure your information and still be hacked.
Anything can be breached. The question is what happens after someone
has stolen the information and released it online. In the past, most
anonymous users were probably still not concerned. They could not
grasp why someone would be interested in their personal information for
non-monetary purposes.9 5 This is what the Sony Hack changed-the
vivid possibility of finding vast amounts of our personal, non-monetary,
information online. Our privacy, and perhaps more importantly, our
liberty to freely use the Internet are at risk more than ever before.
IV.

FACING THE NEW INFORMATION THREAT

If you did not secure your home computer sufficiently, or acted
carelessly when browsing online, and someone stole data from your
computer, you can only blame yourself. But what can you do when third
parties are hacked and your personal information was stolen and
published because of that hack? The legal analysis first calls for an
understanding of the various issues that could arise from cyber-attacks
92. For companies, data breaches can cause a loss of business due to higher customer
turnover, increased customer acquisition costs, and a hit to reputations and goodwill. See Maria
Korolov, Ponemon: DataBreach Costs Now Average $154 Per Record, CSO (May 27, 2015, 6:22
AM), http://www.csoonline.com/article/2926727/data-protection/ponemon-data-breach-costs-nowaverage-I 54-per-record.html.
93. See Kevin McAleavey, The Birth of the Antivirus Industry, INFOSEC ISLAND (July
11, 2011), http://www.infosecisland.com/blogview/15068-The-Birth-of-the-Antivirus-Industry.html
(describing the origins of the computer antivirus industry that dates back to the 1980s).
94. See, e.g., Q&A: Safe Online Banking, BBC NEWS (Nov. 5, 2004, 3:13 PM),

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3986097.stm.
95. See Danah Boyd, Why Youth (Heart) Social Network Sites: The Role of Networked
Publics in Teenage Social Life, in YOUTH, IDENTITY, AND DIGITAL MEDIA 119, 133 (David
Buckingham ed., 2008) ("Most people believe that security through obscurity will serve as a
functional barrier online. For the most part, this is a reasonable assumption. Unless someone is of
particular note or interest, why would anyone search for them?").
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on third parties.9 6 Consider this scenario: someone hacked into a
company's database, stole data, and later published it online on his own
website and across the Internet on other websites. This database has
photos you took, your entire log of email correspondence (for example,
all emails from the last ten years), and your browsing history.
Search engines, such as Google, link to the websites, and, thus, when
someone searches your name, your entire database will appear in its
search results.
What could civilians do in light of such threat? Legally speaking,
there are a few issues that could arise.97 There are generally four main
players that could be legally liable: the hacker, the company (the entity
that holds the information), the publisher (who publishes the
information), and the search engines (which link to the websites).9 8
A. The Hacker
The attackers' responsibility for hacking is obvious. Under the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA")9 9 and state computer hacking
statutes,100 hackers face criminal and civil liability."0 ' Such civil liability
96. See Kristen Shields, Note, Cybersecurity: Recognizing the Risk and Protecting Against
Attacks, 19 N.C. BANKING INST. 345, 351-54 (2015).
97. The focus here is on the civilian as a target and not the company or the attacker. There are
a few possible violations of legal rights here. See id. at 354-57. But the identity of the data holder
and the nature of the data matters. For example, the government holds vast amounts of information
on its citizens (and non-citizens) and could generally be liable for its disclosure. Moreover, some
private parties are also required to keep some forms of information confidential. See id at 357-58.
Examples of these parties are attorneys, psychologists, financial institutions, and even libraries.
See, e.g., id; Sue Michmerhuizen, Confidentiality, Privilege: A Basic Value in Two
Different Applications, CTR. FOR PROF'L REsp. (May 2007), http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/professional-responsibility/confidentiality-or attomrney.authcheckdam.pdf;
ASS'N,
PSYCHOL.
Protecting Your Privacy: Understanding Confidentiality, Am.
http://www.apa.org/helpcenter/confidentiality.aspx (last visited Nov. 22, 2015); Questions and
http://www.ala.org/Template.cfin?
Privacy and Confidentiality, ALA,
Answers on
=
Section=interpretations&Template-/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cft&ContentlD 15347
(last visited Nov. 22, 2015). Here, the goal is to generally analyze the common data holder.
98. See infra Part IV.A-D. A few more intermediaries could also be liable-for example,
OSPs, various manufacturers, civilians acting as "zombie" computers, and even the civilian herself.
But as the likelihood of such liability is low, they are excluded from current discussion. For more on
the possible liability of intermediaries, see Jennifer A. Chandler, Security in Cyberspace:
CombatingDistributedDenial of Service Attacks, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 231, 243-48 (2004);
Luis de Guzman, Unleashinga Curefor the Botnet Zombie Plague: Cybertorts, Counterstrikes,and
Privileges, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 527, 528 (2010) (discussing the unlikelihood that zombie computer
owners are liable for maintaining an under-protected computer).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
100. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 13A-8-112 to -113 (2012). For the updated list of all U.S. state
statutes, see Computer Crime Statutes, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (2015),
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/computer-hacking-and-unauthorized-access-laws.aspx
(last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
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could also be imposed under state tort law.1" 2 The problem here is that,
in many instances, the hacker is irretraceable due to "the attribution
problem,"'0 3 or even if detected, geographically located somewhere that
makes it difficult to bring him to justice."° In many other instances,
defendants are judgment proof and, therefore, are unable to compensate
victims. 1°5 Furthermore, even if the hacker was identified, apprehended
and held liable,10 6 both in criminal and civil law, the civilians' data will
still remain online-the main cause of concern here. Therefore, suing the
hacker may compensate the victim to some extent, but it does not
generally solve the problem.
B.

The Company/Information Holder

The company, which holds its users' information, could face
liability under theories of tort law or contract law. 0 7 The company could
be liable in tort on two causes of action: strict liability or negligence.' 1 8
Strict liability, here, is unlikely, as no abnormally dangerous activity
occurred.0 9 That leaves negligence. Does the company owe a duty to the
ultimate victim? Generally, company owners could be liable for a

101. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030; ALA. CODE § 13A-8-112(b)(1). There are many possible offenses:
intentionally accessing a computer without authorization; exceeding authorized access of a
protected computer; knowingly causing the transmission of a program, information, code, or
command and, as a result of such conduct, intentionally causing damage, without authorization, to a
protected computer; intentionally accessing a protected computer without authorization and, as a
result of such conduct, recklessly causing damage; or intentionally accessing a protected computer
without authorization and, as a result of such conduct, causing damage and loss. See 18 U.S.C
§ 1030(a).
102. Under common law, the primary cause of action will most likely be committing an
intentional tort. See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 8, at 496-98. For a full list of state computer
hacking statutes, see Computer Crime Statutes, supra note 100.
103. See, e.g., David D. Clark & Susan Landau, Untangling Attribution, 2 HARv. NAT'L
SECURITY J. 323, 329 (2011); Shackelford & Andres, supranote 6, at 979.
104. Clark & Landau, supranote 103, at 329.
105. For a full list of civil law shortcomings in cyber-attacks, see Kesan & Hayes, supra note
8, at 469-70.
106. If the attacker is located outside the jurisdiction of U.S. criminal courts, and U.S.
authorities can locate him, they can either ask the foreign jurisdiction to extradite him or alert the
host nation and hope that they will pursue criminal sanctions. Id. at 467-69. However, many states
will not necessarily extradite or prosecute cyber criminals within their borders. Moreover, the
proper venue for a lawsuit would be difficult to determine due to the nature of the Internet. See id.;
Matthew J. Sklerov, Solving the Dilemma of State Responses to Cyberattacks:A Justificationfor the
Use ofActive Defenses Against States Who Neglect Their Duty to Prevent, 201 MIL. L. REV. 1,6-10
(2009).
107. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 8, at 496-98.
108. Intentional tort is also a potential cause of action, but it is generally against the attacker,
not the company. See id
109. Id. at 482 & n.45.
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negligent failure to secure their computer system." ° But this is not
necessarily the case. To hold these companies liable will require proving
proximate cause. 1 ' Still, much like with the hacker, even if the victim
could sue the company, it does not necessarily compensate him
appropriately because the content will still remain available online.
Then, there is contract law. 2 At least some of our data held online
is subject to contract law." 3 It would be difficult to locate a website that
does not have a listed set of "Terms and Conditions.""' 4 Indeed, we are
all familiar with the two-word phrase: "I Agree." It is usually a binding
enforceable contract with the OSP, at least to some extent." 5 The
contract could exist even if you do not actively click on anything and
just use the service. 1 6 Google is an example of such an OSP. When you
use Google, you agree to their terms of service, at least as long as they
are reasonable." 7 It is not surprising that Google can use your data in,
pretty much, any way they wish." 8 Most likely, the license agreement
110. Id.at498.
111. Id.at500-01.
112. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 55, at 52 (stating software companies are liable under
contract law for data breaches). It is obvious that a case-by-case analysis will be required under such
evaluation, as other forms of legal implications could arise, depending on a specific case. The Sony
Hack, for example, requires an examination of the relationship between Sony employees and their
employer in a sense of labor law.
113. Nearly every company website has a page displaying its "Terms of Use" to which users
assent by using the website or clicking "Agree to Terms of Use," which is often upheld by the
courts. See David R. Collins, Note, Shrinkwrap, Clickwrap, and Other Software License
Agreements: Litigating a Digital Pig in a Poke in West Virginia, 111 W. VA. L. REv. 531, 558-66
(2009); Hutchinson, supra note 6, at 1165-66 (discussing the shortcomings of Terms of Use
agreements); Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE, https://www.google.co.il/intl/en/policies/
terms/regional.html (last modified Apr. 30, 2014).
114. See, e.g., Google Terms of Service, supranote 113.
115. See Collins, supra note 113, at 559-60.
116. See supranote 113.
117. See Hutchinson, supranote 6 at 1167-69.
118. Google's potential use of users' information is vast:
When you upload, submit, store, send or receive content to or through our Services,
you give Google (and those we work with) a worldwide license to use, host, store,
reproduce, modify, create derivative works (such as those resulting from translations,
adaptations or other changes we make so that your content works better with our
Services), communicate, publish, publicly perform, publicly display and distribute such
content. The rights you grant in this license are for the limited purpose of operating,
promoting, and improving our Services, and to develop new ones. This license continues
even if you stop using our Services (for example, for a business listing you have added to
Google Maps). Some Services may offer you ways to access and remove content that has
been provided to that Service. Also, in some of our Services, there are terms or settings
that narrow the scope of our use of the content submitted in those Services. Make sure
you have the necessary rights to grant us this license for any content that you submit to
our Services.
Our automated systems analyze your content (including emails) to provide you
personally relevant product features, such as customized search results, tailored
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will limit or disclaim all available warranties and potential liabilities
against the company." 9 But even if the contract is invalid, and the
company is liable, contract law does not generally aid the civilian here.
After all, the issue here is not whether Google misused the information,
because the information was stolen from the company. Moreover,
120
contractual obligations apply to parties that are privy to the contract;
Google is, generally, not to blame.
C. The Publisher
After information is stolen, several websites can publish it online.
The recent Sony Hack demonstrated this potential scenario. In the Sony
Hack, several media groups published email correspondence between
employees, information about executive salaries, and other delicate
personal information. 12' After the Sony Hack, Sony's attorney, David
Boies, sent a letter to various media groups, warning them that if they
indeed possessed "stolen information" from Sony, and they intended to
publish it, they might face legal repercussions. 2 2 In his own words:
If you do not comply with this request, and the Stolen Information is
used or disseminated by you in any manner, [Sony] will have no
choice but to hold you responsible for any damage or loss arising from
such use or dissemination by you, including any damages or loss to
[Sony] or others, and including, but not limited to, any loss of value
of
23
intellectual property and trade secrets resulting from your actions. 1
Does Sony have legal standing? Perhaps, but any conclusion
requires further legal analysis, which is beyond the scope of this Article.
The focus here is on the civilian and not the company. Mainly, beyond

advertising, and span and malware detection. This analysis occurs as the content is sent,
received, and when it is stored.
If you have a Google Account, we may display your Profile name, Profile photo,
and actions you take on Google or on third-party applications connected to your Google
Account (such as +1 's, reviews you write and comments you post) in our Services,
including displaying in ads and other commercial contexts. We will respect the choices
you make to limit sharing or visibility settings in your Google Account. For example,
you can choose your settings so your name and photo do not appear in an ad.
Google Terms of Service, supranote 113.
119. Collins, supranote 113, at 548; Kesan & Hayes, supra note 8, at 499-500.
120. Meg Leta Ambrose, It's About Time: Privacy, Information Life Cycles, and the Right to
Be Forgotten, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 369, 375 (2013).

121. See Zetter, supranote 3.
122. Mike Fleming Jr., Read David Boies' Legal Letter On Sony Hack Attack Coverage,
DEADLINE (Dec. 15, 2014, 10:20 AM), http://deadline.com/2014/12/sony-pictures-letter-davidboies-deadline-1201326203.
123. Id.
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possible duties of data protection, there are two possible claims
available for the civilian: invasion of privacy and intellectual
4
property infringement.1
1. Privacy Torts
Privacy law has various applications. Constitutional law refers to
privacy mostly as a right to protect the civilian against an overbearing
and powerful government. 12 1 It is a right of autonomy-to "decide how

to live and to associate with others.' 26 Over time, new applications of
privacy have emerged, beginning with Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis who articulated the need for a "right to be let alone." 27 Their
suggestion marked the emergence of the common law version of privacy
and the recognition of its need. 12 Mostly, Warren and Brandeis's
articulation of privacy was of a right of selective anonymity. 29 Since
then, various forms of privacy rights have appeared with various levels
of legal protections. 30 Privacy evolved into a tort law concept. Privacy
tort law in most American jurisdictions is reiterated in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.'3 ' Accordingly, there are four possible types of
privacy tort claims that can be invoked: unreasonable intrusion upon
seclusion,' 32 public disclosure of private facts, 3 3 misappropriation, 3 4
and false light.'3
124. See discussion infra Part IV.C.1-2.
125. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
126. See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, False Light Invasion of Privacy: The Light that Failed,
64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 364, 364 (1989).
127. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193
(1890).
128. Zimmerman, supra note 126, at 375-76.
129. Id. at 375-77.
130. The right to privacy has different definitions globally. In U.S. law, for example, certain
aspects of the right to privacy are protected by the Fourth Amendment and by specific legal
regulations, such as the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 ("COPPA"). The right to
privacy is also part of many European constitutions-for example, section 13 of the Swiss
Constitution; section 10 of the German Federal Constitution; sections 3 and 6 of chapter B in the
Swedish Constitution-as well as several human rights conventions, such as the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("ECHR") adopted in
Rome on November 4, 1950, and declarations, such as section 12 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 1948. See Directive 95/46/EC, 31-34; Directive 2002/58/EC, of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the
Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector, 2002 O.J. (L 281) 11, 46.
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (AM. LAW INST. 1977); Patricia Sanchez
Abril, "A Simple, Human Measure o Privacy ": Public Disclosureof Private Facts in the World of
Tiger Woods, 10 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 385, 389 (2011).
132. See Abril, supra note 131, at 389.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A; Abril, supra note 131, at 389; see Ambrose,
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What is most relevant here is the tort of public disclosure.136 The
tort of public disclosure applies when private and highly offensive
information (to a reasonable person) is publicized without legitimate
concern to the public. 137 A valid defense against such claim should rely
on either consent or newsworthiness. 13a If information, stolen or not, is
in the public interest, it will be protected by the First Amendment, and
such information will not be protected by privacy rights. 3' 9
Many scholars argue that the tort of public disclosure is very
weak, 14 1 inapplicable, or even dead. 14 1 For example, any newsworthy
content that "the public has a proper interest in leaming about" is
protected speech, warranting a defense to privacy claims. 142 What will
be deemed as public interest? This is hard to say. Take the Sony Hack as
an example. Some of the stolen documents could be viewed as "of
public concern." Perhaps these documents could reveal unlawful or
unethical behavior of a very large company with many customers
supra note 120, at 375-76; Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis
Wrong?, 31 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 329 (1966); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV.
383, 389 (1960).
136. False light invasion of privacy is not at stake here. This tort claim arises only when the
communicated data is factually untrue or when the data is true but carries a false implication. See
Zimmerman, supra note 126, at 370. Defamation claims require that the claim must generally be
false and, therefore, will not be applicable here. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 451-58
(1976); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 581A; Ambrose, supra note 120, at 375; Zimmerman, supra note 126, at 370-97
(discussing false light invasion of privacy).
137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D. However, note that some jurisdictions
rejected the public disclosure of private facts tort. See Geoff Dendy, The Newsworthiness Defense to
the Public DisclosureTort, 85 KY. L.J. 147, 158-59 (1997); Jacqueline R. Rolfs, The Florida Star v.
B.J.F.: The Beginning of the Endfor the Tort ofPublic Disclosure, 1990 WIS. L. REv. 1107, 1112.
138. Dendy, supra note 137, at 151 ("The primary two defenses to the public disclosure tort are
consent and newsworthiness.").
139. The U.S. Supreme Court has discussed a relatively similar matter in the past. In Bartnicki
v. Vopper, the Court examined what degree of protection the First Amendment provides to speech
that discloses the contents of an illegally intercepted communication. 532 U.S. 514, 517 (2001). The
Court examined three questions to determine whether media's use of illegally obtained information
was permissible: Did the media play a part in the illegal activity? Was their access to the
information obtained lawfully? And was the subject matter of the conversation a matter of public
concern? See id at 525; see also Warren & Brandeis, supra note 127, at 214 ("The right to privacy
does not prohibit any publication of matter which is of public or general interest.").
140. Rodney A. Smolla, Accountingfor the Slow Growth of American Privacy Law, 27 NOVA
L. REv. 289, 290-91, 296-312 (2002).
141. Samantha Barbas, The Death of the Public Disclosure Tort: A HistoricalPerspective,22
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 171, 172 (2010); Jonathan Mintz, The Remains of Privacy's Disclosure Tort:
An Exploration of the Public Domain, 55 MD. L. REV. 425, 426 (1996) ("[O]ne third of the Supreme
Court and most of privacy academia have pronounced dead the more than century-old tort of public
disclosure of private facts.").
142. Ambrose, supra note 120, at 377; see Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 382-85 (1967); see
also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 487-97 (1975) (holding that truthful
publication of a rape victim's name was constitutionally protected).
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worldwide. However, it might take more than that to establish a matter
of public concern.
Overall, some civilians will possess a real claim against the
publisher. Ordinary email correspondence with your mother is not
generally newsworthy content. But once again, the legal system will not
necessarily aid the civilian. Even if the publisher is culpable, bringing
him to justice might be impractical.' 43 And even if all this is possible,
still, it will not achieve the desired purpose-permanently and
expeditiously removing the stolen content from public viewing.'44
2. Intellectual Property
Data can be copyrightable. Copyright law grants copyright
protection to original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium
of expression.1 45 Although registration is not a condition for copyright
protection, 46 it is nonetheless necessary in order to accrue certain rights
and benefits. 47 Thus, if copyright law protects the stolen data, civilians
could possibly make use of its provisions to recover damages andlor
even remove it.
But not all data is copyrightable, as copyright law requires
originality and fixation.148 Consider emails as an example. Emails could
be copyrightable as literary works,1 49 as long as they meet a certain level
of originality, which necessitates independent creation plus a modicum
143. See Barbas, supra note 141, at 199-200 (arguing that the expansive definition of matters
of public concern leaves few privacy plaintiffs successful); Dendy, supra note 137, at 158 n.77
(noting that several states do not recognize a cause of action for the publication of private facts);
Mintz, supra note 141, at 446 ("[Plaintiffs' privacy rights rarely prevail over the public's interests,
rendering the limitation on the scope of the public interest essentially theoretical and leaving
plaintiffs with rare success." (footnote call number omitted)).
144. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652H (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (outlining the
form of relief available in a cause of action for invasion of privacy as compensatory rather than
injunctive).
145. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). Works of authorship include literary, musical, dramatic,
pantomimes, choreographic, pictorial, graphic, sculptural, motion pictures, audiovisual, and
architectural works, as well as sound recordings. See § 102(a)(1)-(8). Ideas, procedures, processes,
systems, method of operations, concepts, principles, and discoveries are not protected. § 102(b).
146. Registration in the United States is codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 408-412 (2012).
147. See Erin Hogan, Survey, Approval Versus Application: How to Interpret the Registration
Requirement Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 843, 843 (2006) ("Although an
original work is protected the moment it is fixed in a tangible form, certain rights and benefits
accrue only upon copyright registration." (footnote call number omitted)). For example, in a civil
action, registration or preregistration of a domestic work is a necessary requirement in order to sue
for copyright infringement and to claim attorney's fees and statutory damages. See 17 U.S.C.
§§ 411(a), 412.
148. See supranote 147 and accompanying text.
149. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining copyrightable "literary works" as works "expressed in
words.., regardless of the nature of the material objects ... in which they are embodied").
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of creativity.15 ° Whether emails are "creative" enough to meet the
threshold of originality is debatable, but in most cases they are. In those
cases, publishing emails, or a portion of them, could be considered
copyright infringement.
Three main issues arise from using copyright as a tool for
compensating victims and/or removing content. First, as mentioned, the
subject matter is not necessarily copyrightable. It depends on the nature
of the data that was stolen and published online. Thus, not every civilian
could acquire the benefits of copyright law, that is, use it for data
removal and possibly receive damages.' 51 Second, the civilian is not
necessarily the copyright owner of the work. If a stolen photo from your
database was photographed by someone else, then you will be excluded
from copyright protection.' 52 Third, even if the subject matter is
copyrightable and the civilian is its rightful owner, she would be
required to pre-register the work to sue for copyright infringement.'53
Even assuming compensation is feasible, it would still prove insufficient
to solve the problem. A different claim could aid in solving the problem,
even if the work is not registered. This is due to the notice-and-takedown
154
provision set by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
Under notice-and-takedown, even if the work is not registered, a
copyright owner can request to remove online content from the
publisher. 55 However, the DMCA also sets a timing requirement if the
OSP receives a counter-notification from the allegedly infringing
party.' 56 In that case, the copyright owner must file suit within ten to
fourteen days to prevent the OSP from replacing the material.' 57 If not
registered, the lawsuit will be subject to dismissal.'
150. See, e.g., Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (noting that
the requisite level of creativity in copyright law is extremely low); John Muller & Co. v. N.Y.
Arrows Soccer Team, Inc., 802 F.2d 989, 990 (8th Cir. 1986) (affirming a refusal to register a logo
which lacked the minimal creativity necessary to support a copyright).
151. See infra text accompanying notes 170-77. For more on the removal process of infringing
copyrighted materials, see infra note 170.
152. 17 U.S.C. § 20 1(a) (granting copyright protection only to author or authors of a work).
153. Under U.S. copyright law, no civil action for infringement of the copyright shall be
instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 411 (a).

154.
(codified
155.
156.
2013).
157.

Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201-1205, 1301-1332; 28 U.S.C. § 4001 (2012)).
17 U.S.C. § 512.
See Schenck v. Orosz, No. 3:13-CV-0294, 2013 WL 5963557, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 7,
See id.

158. Such decision will depend upon the jurisdiction. Some jurisdictions adopted a
"registration approach" whereas copyright is "registered" only when the Copyright Office passes on
the material submitted by the applicant. Others have adopted an "application approach," under
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Using copyright law to fight the release of unlawfully obtained data
is problematic. Although it could be useful in some cases, it is fairly
limited to original (and creative) works that were created by the
civilian. 59 Moreover, even if civilians can make use of the DMCA's
notice-and-takedown provisions, the data could orbit the digital
environment for a long time before its removal, and it might be viewed
by others before being taken down. 6 ° Still, it seems like the best current
mechanism for quickly removing at least some types of content.
D. The Search Engine
Search engines are generally not directly liable for the hack or its
consequences. 16' They only link to the website and, therefore, could only
possibly face secondary liability. 62 With respect to torts, if the search
engine will be deemed an "interactive computer service"' 6 3 under the
Communications Decency Act ("CDA"),164 it will be immunized from
civil liability for defamatory material.' 6 5 Such providers will not be
"treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another .... ,166 But, moreover, search engines will most likely be
exempt from liability for linking to the websites. Regarding copyright
infringement, they are generally exempt from liability if they implement
certain enforcement methods, such as notice-and-takedown mechanisms,
and identify subscribers who allegedly infringed upon copyrighted
content after receiving a subpoena. 67 Thus, it is difficult for civilians to
receive damages from the search engine.
But can they nonetheless request removal of the links to the
content? Much like in the case of the publisher, the civilian can use the
which the copyright is "registered" upon submitting the requisite fee, deposit, and application. See
id. at 1106-07.
159. See Ambrose, supra note 120, at 375 (arguing that although copyright could be very
useful for preventing the replication of content created by the information subject, it only "reaches
the creative aspects of that work and does not reach information created by another related to the
subject").
160. Seeid. at 394-95.
161. See Seema Ghatnekar, Injury by Algorithm: A Look into Google's Liability for
Defamatory Autocompleted Search Suggestions, 33 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 171, 185-88 (2013).
162. See id.
163. An interactive computer service is defined as "any information service, system, or access
software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server,
including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems
operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions." 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2012).
164. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (1996) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 223, 230 (2012)).
165. See Ghatnekar, supra note 161, at 189.
166. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). For a discussion on whether Google is an "interactive
computer service" under the CDA, see Ghatnekar, supranote 161, at 194-201.
167. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(1), (h)(5) (2012).
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16
DMCA's notice-and-takedown provision for removing the content.
But other than copyrighted materials, removing non-copyrightable
content is not an easy task. Take Google U.S.'s removal policy as an
example. 69 Say you wish to remove a link from Google search results.
Typically, Google will respond by referring you to "the website owner
(webmaster) and ask them to remove the information."' 70 Generally,
Google will intervene only when "sensitive personal information" is
involved."'7 Information is deemed sensitive when its disclosure, if made
public, puts someone at greater risk for "identity theft, financial fraud,
and other harms."' 7 2 More specifically, Google refers to national
identification numbers, bank account numbers, credit card numbers,
images of signatures, and offensive images. 13 Thus, the current U.S.
legal regime will most likely protect search engines in their refusal to
remove links to the data, or at least, to any data that does not enjoy
copyright protection or falls into narrowly predefined categories.
Civilians can use the legal system to recover damages. However, it
might not be an easy task, and they will not necessarily win. But,
moreover, it will only grant insufficient damages ex post facto. 7 4 The
problem here is different. The damage is not monetary in the classical
sense. When everyone in the world is able to view your personal data,
there could be many negative consequences that are not necessarily
monetary. As we saw, only a valid copyright infringement claim and/or
limited predefined conditions set by the OSP will allow an individual to
remove online content. This is absurd, of course. Even if some data will
be copyrightable, it will not cover all types of data. What is missing
from the current legal system is an effective remedy for civilians-an
immediate removal of the content and erasing of any traces of it-the
"right to be forgotten" which exists, to some extent, in the EU.'

168. The DMCA allows a person to send a statutorily compliant notice, which notifies the OSP
of the copyrighted material and requests its removal. See Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter,
Efficient Process or 'Chilling Effects?' Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 624-25, 625 n. 12
(2006).
169. Remove Information from Google, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/websearch/

troubleshooter/3111061?hl=en (last visited Nov. 22, 2015). For an empirical study of Google's
removal of content policy, see generally Jane R. Bambauer & Derek E. Bambauer, Vanished, 18
VA. J.L. & TECH. 137 (2013).
170. Remove Informationfrom Google, supra note 169.
171. Id.
172. Removal Policies, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/2744324 (last
visited Nov. 22, 2015).
173. Id.
174. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 8, at 474.
175. See infra Part V.A.
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V.

THE NEED FOR A FORGETFUL INTERNET

The Internet rarely forgets. Once information is accessible online, it
could forever orbit in the digital atmosphere.' 76 Thus, in the digital
world, we might have lost the ability to be forgotten. Every picture
posted, comment made, or video uploaded is there to stay and for others
to see. Search engines make this information easily accessible to the
public. Isn't it great to live in an ever-knowing society with endless
information and possibilities of knowledge? Not always. Constantly
being under a magnifying glass could prove harmful to our opportunities
in the future. For example, a picture of a teenager drinking at a party
could affect her career opportunities for the rest of her life. 177 A neverforgetting Internet could lead to "Reputation Bankruptcy."'' 78 We are in a
conflict between the thirst to know and the fear of consumption. The EU
recently recognized the need for a forgetful Internet by articulating a
right to be forgotten. 179 This Part will analyze the right to be forgotten in
the EU while arguing that such a right is overbroad, and among its many
flaws, poses a threat to the future of the Internet. 8° However, as our
liberty to freely use the Internet should be preserved, other, more limited
solutions could suffice.
A. The Right to Be Forgotten
The EU recognized the importance of protecting end-users long
before the Sony Hack. The EU examined the right to privacy and found
it as insufficient to the extent it does not protect the interests of endusers in controlling their information online.' 8 ' Under this view of
privacy, end-users are in need of a legal right which will enable them to
decide what personal information could be posted online or available via
search engines. This gave birth to a proposed new right to be forgotten.
The right to be forgotten originates from the French "right of
oblivion" (le droit 6 l'oubli) which censors the facts of an ex-criminal's

176. See Ambrose, supra note 120, at 394-96.
177. For an example of the possible effect of an online photo on career opportunities, see
Jeffrey Rosen, The Web Means the End of Forgetting,N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 26, 2010, at 30, 32.
178.

See JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 228-29

(2008).
179. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REv. 88, 91 (2012); infra
Part V.A.
180. See infra Part V.A-B.
181. See Viviane Reding, Vice President, European Comm'n, The EU Data Protection Reform
2012: Making Europe the Standard Setter for Modem Data Protection Rules in the Digital Age,
Speech to the Innovation Conference Digital, Life, Design 5 (Jan. 22, 2012),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseSPEECH-12-26_en.htm.
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conviction and incarceration, designed to allow rehabilitation.' 82 The
right to be forgotten has been debated for more than two years in the EU
as part of the GDPR.' 83 Proposed by Viviane Reding, the European
Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights, and Citizenship, 8 4 the
right to be forgotten is designed to enable the data subject to "obtain
from the controller the erasure of personal data relating to them and the
abstention from further dissemination of such data, especially in relation
to personal data which are made available by the data subject while he or
she was a child." The right is available under the following
circumstances: (1) when the data is no longer necessary in relation to the
original purposes;' 85 (2) when the data subject withdraws consent or
when the storage period consented to has expired, and there is no other
legal ground for processing of the data;' 86 (3) when the data subject
objects to the processing of personal data;' 87 and (4) when the processing
of the data does not comply with EU regulations for other reasons."'
A limited right to be forgotten is already part of EU law through the
Data Protection Directive ("Directive"). 8 9 The Directive sets the right to
access data and the conditions for blocking data when
"processing... does not comply with the provisions of th[e] Directive,
in particular because of the incomplete or inaccurate nature of the
data."' 9 ° Member States must guarantee that every data subject has the
right to obtain from the controller "the rectification, erasure or blocking
of data, when the data processing is not in compliance with the Directive
and particularly in instances where the data are incomplete or
inaccurate."'' Article 6 ensures that personal data must be:
(a) processed fairly and lawfully; (b) collected for specified, explicit
and legitimate purposes . . . [in addition to] historical, statistical or
provided that Member States provide
scientific purposes .
appropriate safeguards; (c) adequate, relevant and not excessive in
relation to the purposes for which they are collected and/or further
182. See Rosen, supra note 179, at 88.
183. See id
184. Reding, supra note 181, at 3, 5. See generally Rosen, supra note 179 (exploring the right
to be forgotten proposal in the EU).
185. Proposalfor a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement Of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), at COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 1,
2005) [hereinafter GeneralDataProtectionRegulation].
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Directive 95/461EC.
190. Id. art. 12(b).
191. Id.
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processed; (d) accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every
reasonable step must be taken to ensure that data which are inaccurate
or incomplete, having regard to the purposes for which they were
collected or for which they are further processed, are erased or
rectified; (e) kept in a form which permits identification of data
subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the
data were collected or for which they are further processed [personal
data stored for longer
periods should be] stored for historical, statistical
192
or scientific use.
Thus, a limited right to be forgotten already exists in the EU, as
long as member states legislate that right. Recently, the Court of Justice
of the EU implemented Article 6 of the Data Protection Directive, giving
life to the right to be forgotten, or a "right of erasure," in the EU.'93 Back
in 1998, Mario Costeja Gonzdlez's house was repossessed and put up for
auction for the recovery of social security debts. 194 La Vanguardia
Ediciones SL published this information in its newspaper, which was
also available online.'95 Since that time, when someone Googled
Gonzdlez, two links to La Vanguardia's articles, from January and
March of 1998, would show up. 19 6 Dissatisfied with Google's results, on
March 5, 2010, Mr. Gonzdilez and the Spanish Data Protection Agency
lodged a complaint against La Vanguardia Ediciones, Google Spain,
and Google, Inc.' 97

Gonzdlez requested that La Vanguardia remove or alter those
search pages so that the personal data relating to him no longer
appeared, or that the company use certain tools made available by search
engines to protect the data.'98 Gonzdlez also requested that Google
''remove or conceal the personal data relating to him so that they cease
to be included in the search results and no longer appeared in the links to
La Vanguardia."' 99 The reason for such requests, according to
Gonzdlez, was that the context of the attachment proceedings concerning
him was now entirely irrelevant, as it had been fully resolved for a
number of years.200

192. Id.art. 6.
193. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espafiola de Proteccion de Datos (AEPD),
2014 EUR-Lex CELEX 62012CJ0131 4 (May 13, 2014).
194. Id. 14.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. 15.
199. Id.
200. Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2015

25

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 3

HOFSTRA LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 44:41

The Court of Justice found in Mr. Gonzilez's favor and held that
search engine operators are responsible for their processing of personal
data appearing on web pages published by third parties." 1 The court
held that processing of personal data and the free movement of such data
are interpreted as "processing of personal data" within the meaning of
the Directive when the information contains personal data, and that
search engines are the "controllers" with respect to that processing,
within the meaning of Article 2(d) of the Directive.20 2 Thus, search
engines should exclude results "where they appear to be inadequate,
irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation to those
purposes and in the light of the time that has elapsed. ' 20 3 In other words,
search engines that operate in the EU are required to remove any
material that is "inadequate, irrelevant" or "excessive," but this must be
"fair[ly] balanced" against the public's right to the information.0 4 An
individual is entitled to ask the search engine to remove the links, and
the search engine (Google in this case) is obliged to remove links to web
pages. The exceptions include "particular reasons, such as the role
played by the data subject in public life... justifying] a preponderant
interest of the public in having... access to the information when such a
search is made., 20 5 Though limited to some extent, the ruling sets the
ground for a right to be forgotten, or more accurately to a right of
erasure, even prior to the Directive.
Google complied with the Court of Justice's decision not long after
its ruling, and the company offered all Europeans a chance to exercise
their new right online, by filing a removal request.20 6 These requests
must clarify why the URL requested to be removed from Google's
search results is now irrelevant, outdated, or otherwise inappropriate.20 7
Subsequently, many Europeans chose to exercise their right; in less than
a year, more than 200,000 individuals filed removal requests to
Google.20 8 After a removal request is filed, Google examines the link
201. Id. 23-41.
202. Id. 26-41.
203. Id. 93 (emphasis added).
204. Id. 81, 92-94.
205. Id. 97.
206. See Legal Removal Requests, GOOGLE,
311040?rd=l &hl=en (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
207.

Search Removal Request

https://support.google.com/legal/answer/

Under Data Protection Law

in Europe,

GOOGLE,

https://support.google.com/legal/contactllr-eudpa?product--websearch&vid=null (last visited Nov.
22, 2015). The removal request also demands a copy of a valid form of photo ID, personal details,
and links associated with the content that you want removed. See id
208.

See Lance Whitney, Google Wants to Limit 'Right to Be Forgotten' Requests to Europe,

CNET (Jan. 20, 2015, 1:12 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/google-aims-to-limits-right-to-beforgotten-requests-to-european-sites.
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and determines whether it should be removed from Google services in
the EU.20 9 When possible, Google notifies the website that the
link was removed, but the website cannot object to Google's decision by
any means.21 °
Does the current right to be forgotten solve our problem? Not
really, as the EU ruling refers to personal information posted online
which is outdated or no longer relevant. If someone stole your email
from last week, it does not fall into this category. However, Article 6
also ensures that personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully and
collected for specified, explicit, and legitimate purposes.2 ' Moreover,
the data should be adequate, relevant, and not excessive in relation to the
12
purposes for which they are collected and/or further processed.2
Stealing personal information through a cyber hack, without public
interests, and posting them online could fall into Article 6 categories.
But this broad interpretation of the Directive is not likely.
B.

The Needfor CyberLiberty

13
The right to be forgotten is highly problematic. It is complex,
2 15 leads to possible
costly,21 4 raises high barriers of market entry,
GOOGLE,
Questions,
Asked
Frequently
Report:
Transparency
209. See
u
http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/europeprivacy/faq/?hl=en#how-doy
decide (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
210. For an example of how Google exercised the right to be forgotten on six articles published
on the Guardian website, see James Ball, EU's Right to Be Forgotten: GuardianArticles Have Been
Hidden by Google, GUARDIAN (July 2, 2014, 10:34 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2014/jul/02/eu-right-to-be-forgotten-guardian-google.
211. See GeneralDataProtectionRepresentation,supra note 185, at art. 6.
212. Id.
213. For example, how will search engines comply with such a right? Most likely, and as
Google has already began implementing, by creating a "removal process" and examining every
"removal" request thoroughly, while deciding whether the search results are, in fact, inadequate,
irrelevant, or excessive. See Search Removal Request UnderData ProtectionLaw in Europe, supra
note 207. Creating an online "removal" form for EU members is the easy part for search engines. It
is relatively inexpensive and does not require allocating human resources. The more difficult aspect
of the EU ruling is the method of examining whether the request to remove search results is
inadequate, irrelevant, or excessive. No doubt, human intervention is required for this step.
Currently, computers cannot simply make an educated decision on whether a link's content falls
into one of the categories set by the directive. Naturally, such a subjective decision is not easy for
humans, let alone computers. But on which grounds will Google employees decide? Which
information will fall into one of the Directive's categories?
214. Exercising the right to be forgotten will not come cheap. The "removal" process requires a
decision by a human being and, therefore, demands allocating financial resources. Unlike a semiautomated process of decision making, such as the notice-and-takedown regime of copyright
infringement under the Electronic Commerce Directive or the DMCA in the United States, 17
U.S.C. § 512 (2012), the right to be forgotten requires human intervention and, thus, human
resources. For more on the possible negative impact of the EU decision, see Craig A. Newman, 'A
Right to be Forgotten' Ruling Will Cost Europe, WASH. POST (May 27, 2014),
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manipulation and fragmentation of search results, 216 and is not
necessarily applicable, 217 among other things. Mainly, it leads to
undesired levels of Internet censorship. The right to be forgotten
negatively affects free speech and freedom of information.218
Normatively, civilians should possess a right to ensure that some data is
deleted from the Internet, or at least, is not searchable by search engines.
But this right should not extend to everything. There is a huge difference
between a person who typed and posted personal information and regrets
it and a person whose information was stolen and posted without her
knowledge or consent. It is also different if information was posted
lawfully by someone other than the end-user, such as in the Gonzalez
case. 21 9 If you posted something, and now want to delete it-tough

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-right-to-be-forgotten-will-cost-europe/2014/05/26/
93bb0e8c-e131-1 le3-9743-bb9b59cde7b9_story.html.
215. Even if some search engines possess sufficient financial resources to comply with the EU
decision, other search engines that are not that wealthy will not. Thus, high costs of compliance
create another problem-high barriers of market entry. Steven C. Bennett, The "Right to Be
Forgotten": Reconciling EUand US Perspectives, 30 BERKLEY J. INT'L L. 161, 186-87 (2012). The
right to be forgotten does not affect merely Google-in fact, Google might actually benefit from the
right to be forgotten, as it could reduce competition, especially from new competitors. New search
engines will have much more difficulty complying with the EU decision. We all lose from such a
scenario, as innovation will feel a huge impact. If this occurred at the beginning of the twenty first
century, we likely would never have even heard of Google. Additionally, this EU decision could
also negatively affect investments in the EU, as new companies will choose to ban their services in
the EU due to the financial implications.
216. Until now, Google in the United States and Google in the EU were not much different:
U.S. and EU users would receive similar search results with respect to previously determined
algorithm differences set by Google. See Google Begins Taking Requests to Censor Search Results
in Europe, CBS NEWS (May 30, 2014, 11:25 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/google-beginstaking-requests-to-censor-search-results-in-europe. However, the European court's decision
fragments the search results between Google U.S. and Google EU. See Whitney, supra note 208.
From now on, EU citizens will see different search results than U.S. citizens. See id. Fragmentation
of search results will change the Internet. The world should have the opportunity to explore the vast
amounts of information globally, without major differences from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
217. If Europeans know that their search results are being manipulated, some will find a way to
bypass this form of censorship. Employers, for example, might wish to compare U.S. and EU
Google results, to find out if their workers are trying to hide something from them. Currently, you
only need basic computer skills to achieve that-just click on the link saying "Use Google.com" in
the bottom right-hand comer of your Google homepage. Such a comparison will enable these
employers to quickly discover the more "interesting" search results, as it will be missing from
Google in the EU. See Jonathan Zittrain, Don't Force Google to 'Forget,'N.Y. TIMES, May 14,
2014, at A29 ("Even in Europe, search engine users will no doubt cultivate the same Intemet
'workarounds' that Chinese citizens use to see what their government doesn't want them to see.").
218. Freedom of expression in the EU is set mainly by ECHR (along with article II of the
European Charter of Fundamental Rights). See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union, art. 11, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1; Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5.
219. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espaflola de Proteccion de Datos (AEPD),
2014 EUR-Lex CELEX 62012CJ0131 65 (May 13, 2014).
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luck. 22 1 Same goes for when someone else took your picture eating a
hotdog down the street or drunk at a party. But if someone broke into
your house, installed a hidden video camera, and posted private videos
of you online-you should have a right to remove those videos.22 1
Thus, what we should prevent is the availability of non-newsworthy
data that was obtained unlawfully. It is not merely a matter of privacy. It
is a liberty to trustfully use cyberspace. Call it the right to cyber liberty.
What is the most efficient method to ensure such right? If we embrace
Lawrence Lessig's approach, there are four modalities (or constraints)
for regulating behavior: law, market, social norms, and architectural
design (code).222 Any of the four modalities can aid civilians in their
quest for protection against data linkage.
We begin with social norms and the market. In theory, under this
approach, if society condemned such behavior, it would cease. I am
rather skeptical here. Many hackers are nonconformists by nature.2 23
Their operations are not based on social norms to begin with. Therefore,
changing social norms will unlikely succeed in regulating unlawful
information from the hacker perspective. That leaves the users. Will
Internet users not "use" data that was stolen through a cyber-attack?
Even if technologically feasible, meaning that end-users can identify
which data was released from a cyber-attack, it is implausible that
Thus, the market will also be
everyone will comply with such a norm.
224
fairly limited in solving the problem.
Can technology (code) grant cyber liberty? It can, to some extent.
For example, using privacy-by-design ("PBD") could change the

220. An exception could possibly be made for minors who carelessly post data online and,
perhaps, should have the ability to delete it because they simply do not understand the possible
future consequences of their actions. For example, California recently signed a new law that gives
minors the right to erase posts they have made to online sites. See Cal. St. Leg., S.B. 568, 2013
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013); California Enacts PoorMan's Right to Be Forgotten, INFOSECURITY
(Sept. 24, 2013), http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/view/34693/califomia-enacts-poor-mansright-to-be-forgotten.
221. In this case, copyright law does not apply, as you are not the right holder of the videos.
222. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 121-37 (2006); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE
CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND

CONTROL CREATIVITY 116-73 (2004). Michael Bimhack suggested that social norms and the
market could be addressed as one because crediting importance to the free market makes it a social
value. See Michael Birnhack, Lex Machina: Information Security and Israeli Computer Act, 4
SHA'AREY MISHPAT 315, 320 n. 13 (2006) (Isr.).
223. Roger G. John, Physical Vulnerability Assessment, in CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
SECURITY: ASSESSMENT, PREVENTION, DETECTION, RESPONSE 21, 29 (Francesco Flammini ed.,

2012) ("Hacker-type people are often nonconformists.").
224. For more on the market solution, see Eric Goldman, Search Engine Bias and the Demise
of Search Engine Utopianism, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 188, 200 (2006).
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defaults of information storing.225 Various values of privacy could be
built into the systems that preserve our online data. In that way, using
preventative technological measures could reduce the instances of data
theft. A restrictive PBD system could completely ban information
storage-no one will be allowed to retain data. A less restrictive measure
would be setting expiration dates for information retention 2 26 -a
"Reputation Bankruptcy" which will grant civilians an ability to deemphasize or entirely delete online information about them. 227 On the

other hand, using such mechanisms would also be problematic because
we need data storage to enjoy our online experience. From emails to
cloud computing storage, data retention has become essential for the
Internet. Thus, although technology could potentially aid civilians to
preserve their online liberties, it will probably not address the issue, and
furthermore, its implementation will be highly problematic. However,
technology could aid in identifying which data was stolen by using
digital fingerprints. All data has unique fingerprints and could be located
by others, if desired. It resembles the well-known practice of marking
bills, often used by law enforcement agencies to trace and identify
money used for illegal activities.2 28 Combined with a complementary
legal framework, utilizing digital fingerprints could aid in solving the
problem, but will not be sufficient on its own.
Turning now to the law, a few legal mechanisms could aid in
accomplishing the desired goal. We can strengthen current civil and
criminal penalties and, thereby, increase their effectiveness. However,
225. For more on privacy-by-design, see ANN CAVOUKIAN & JEFF JONAS, PRIVACY BY
DESIGN,
PRIVACY
BY
DESIGN
IN
THE
AGE
OF
BIG
DATA
7-9
(2012),

https://www.privacybydesign.ca/content/uploads/2012/06/pbd-bigdata.pdf.
226. To some extent, there could be a technological solution for the phenomenon of a "neverforgetting-web." TigerText, for example, offers a service that restricts text-message copying and
forwarding and the ability to control message lifespan. See Features, TIGERTEXT,
http://www.tigertext.com/features (last visited on Nov. 22, 2015). There are similar apps for social
media postings. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Deciders: The Future of Privacy and Free Speech in the
Age of Facebook and Google, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1525, 1535 (2012) (describing technological
solutions to the right to be forgotten). Viktor Mayer-Schbnberger suggested incorporating an
"expiration meta tag" into digital files, so that like our memory, information will have a life span.
VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE DIGITAL AGE 15,

171-73 (2009). There are a few examples of technologies that embraced this viewpoint, such as
XPire-an app developed to reduce your digital footprint. XPIRE, http://www.getxpire.com (last
visited Nov. 22, 2015); see also Muge Fazlioglu, Forget Me Not: The Clash of the Right to Be
Forgotten and Freedom of Expression on the Internet, 3 INT'L DATA PRIVACY L. 149, 152-53
(2013) (discussing XPire and Viktor Mayer-Schonberger's approach to information).
227. ZITTRAIN, supra note 178, at 228-29.
228. See Adam Tanner, The Web Cookie Is Dying. Here's the Creepier Technology That
Comes Next, FORBES (June 17, 2013, 12:29 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/adamtanner/
2013/06/I7/the-web-cookie-is-dying-heres-the-creepier-technology-that-comes-next (describing the
practice of digital fingerprinting).
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deterrence will unlikely solve this problem, as it will be ineffective.229
Data retention regulation is another possible solution. Congress could
impose liability in various forms on companies that hold and process
personal information of civilians. 23" But this is not practical, and, even if
it were, it is not enough. 23 1 Cyber-attacks would still occur, as no
company is resilient to zero-day exploits.23 2 We can take this one step
further by completely banning information storing. But as previously
discussed, on a cost-benefit scale, this would be a poor decision-we
need data storage. It is crucial for the existence of many online
activities.233 Besides, as Snowden revealed,234 the government already
holds vast amounts of information, and they could also be hacked one
day, and thus, it will not solve the problem. We could also enable
counterstrikes, such as granting a civil "self-defense" provision for
civilians, which could enable them to hack back the perpetrators. But,
not only would such a provision not solve the problem, it could also
potentially backfire.23 5
Another possible solution, which I have already mentioned, is a
right to be forgotten, which applies solely to non-newsworthy data that
was obtained unlawfully. Such right should be secured by an easy and
accessible procedure for those civilians whose information was stolen
and published in a cyber-attack. Under this right, website and search
engines owners will be required to adopt and implement a notice-andtakedown policy, similar to copyright infringement under the DMCA.23 6
229. On skepticism of computer legislation as a deterrent to commence crimes, see U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: ADEQUACY OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINE PENALTIES FOR COMPUTER FRAUD AND VANDALISM OFFENSES 6, 9 (1996).

230. For more on data retention in the United States, see generally Catherine Crump, Note,
Data Retention: Privacy, Anonymity, and Accountability Online, 56 STAN. L. REv. 191 (2004)

(discussing data retention policies in the United States and the legal implications).
231. Public choice theories alone will prove how difficult such a move could be. Organized
groups with shared interests and defined goals tend to influence legislation more than the general
public. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 285-88
(1965); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE H: A REVISED EDITION OF PUBLIC CHOICE 308-10

(1989).
232.

A zero-day exploit refers to a software vulnerability for which a malicious hacker creates

an exploit prior to when the software vendor is made aware of the vulnerability. See Top Cyber
Security Risks-Zero-Day Vulnerability Trends, SANS INST. (Sept. 2009), http://www.sans.org/topcyber-security-risks/zero-day.php; see also Kesan & Hayes, supra note 8, at 474 ("[P]assive defense
is all but useless against zero-day exploits.").

233.

Online data is used for marketing, verifying transactions, shipping products, and many

other functions for online companies. See Hutchinson, supra note 6, at 1152.
234. See supra note 77.

235. For a counterattack privilege proposition, see Huang, supranote 41, at 1259-63.
236. Under the DMCA, OSPs are exempt from liability when they act expeditiously to remove
infringing material after notification of its presence by a copyright holder. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(c)(1)(C) (2012); Meg Leta Ambrose et al., Seeking Digital Redemption: The Future of
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How could this work? All online hosts would be required to implement
an accessible removal process. Under such a removal process, any
individual could file a request to remove online content when it is nonnewsworthy and unlawfully obtained.237 The request should have to
identify the data in a reasonably sufficient manner to permit the host to
locate the material, provide information reasonably sufficient to contact
the complaining party, and provide a statement that the notification is
accurate. To avoid potential legal liability, upon receiving notice from an
individual or her agents, the online host will act expeditiously to remove
the content. At this point, the publisher could then send a counternotification. If such counter-notification is filed, the complaining party
then must bring a lawsuit against the publisher, and if such lawsuit is not
filed within a limited time frame set by the law, the data will become
accessible again.
But this notice-and-takedown mechanism also possesses many
flaws. Much like the implementation of the right to be forgotten in the
EU, the removal process is complex and costly; it raises high barriers for
market entry for non-wealthy online hosts, which will not be able to bear
the costs of compliance; it creates fragmentation of search results; it is
not necessarily applicable; and most significantly, it burdens free speech
and places censorship on the Internet.23
Perhaps, some of these flaws could be solved with a proper legal
design. The process could be designed to be relatively cheap and simple,
as it should not require human intervention. If someone made a claim
that fell within the defined categories, the online host would remove it. If
such claim is falsely made, the market could force its correction. Unlike
the current right to be forgotten in the EU, the online host should not
evaluate the content and decide what is "newsworthy." This is a
subjective decision, but if something is newsworthy, then it will be
quickly republished anyway. How? Through proper transparency. We
should have the ability to know generally what was removed.239 Upon
Forgiveness in the Internet Age, 29 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 99,
158-62 (2012).
237. A proper notice should be similar to the current notice-and-takedown provision regarding
copyright infringement. Hence, it should be a written communication provided to the designated
agent of a service provider and include: a physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to
act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed; identification of the
material that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, and information reasonably
sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the material; and a statement that the information
in the notification is accurate. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) (2012).
238. See supranotes 213-22 and accompanying text.
239. In response to a possible chilling effect due to a DMCA notice-and-takedown
request, Wendy Seltzer created a website that allows the recipients of notices to submit them to the
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removal of the content, the online host could publish the complaint.
Moreover, newsworthy data will most likely continue to orbit the
Internet, even if it was removed from most websites.
Nevertheless, a right to be forgotten, even if more limited, has too
high a social cost. It could be misused to change the way we consume
information. But we should not be naive. Google already decides on our
freedom to access information. 40 Google can place anyone so far down
2 41
the list of search results that the information is inaccessible de facto.
But still, the dangers to free speech are too high here. Because of this, it
is implausible that Congress will enact such a law. The main barrier
would be the First Amendment, which states that "Congress shall make
'
Free speech has
no law ...abridging the freedom of speech."242
permitted restrictions depending on the content, for example, in cases
including obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech integral
to criminal conduct.243 A right to be forgotten in the United States
clearly could impose a restriction on free speech, but it depends on the
target. The "speech" of a website from abroad is unlikely to be protected
under the U.S. Constitution. 244 But suppose that the restriction is placed
on a U.S. company. Whether or not the company's posting is regular or
commercial speech,245 such a restriction imposes a restriction on free
speech, and must withstand constitutional scrutiny. 246 Content-neutral
24 7
restrictions only need to meet an intermediate standard of scrutiny.
However, here we have content-based restrictions on freedom of speech

site. See About Us, CHILLING EFFECTS, http://www.chillingeffects.org/pages/about (last visited Nov.
22, 2015).
240. See Google Terms of Service, supra note 113. Google does not deny that there are also
human elements in the search results, but insists that such intervention only occurs in very limited
cases where the manual control is necessary to improve the users experience. See Inside Search:
Policies, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/insidesearch/howsearchworks/policies.html (last visited
Nov. 22, 2015). Under these limited cases, Google lists security concerns, legal issues, exception
lists, and spain. Id.
241.

See Inside Search: Policies,supra note 240.

242. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
243. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) ("From 1791 to the present, the
First Amendment has permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited
areas ....including obscenity, ... defamation,... fraud, .. . incitement.... and speech integral to
criminal conduct ...").
244.

See generally Timothy Zick, The FirstAmendment in Trans-BorderPerspective: Towards

More Cosmopolitan Orientation, 52 B.C. L. REv. 941 (2011) (discussing the cross-border
application of the First Amendment right to free speech).
245. Commercial speech is less protected by the Constitution than regular speech. See Cent.
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980).
246. Id. at 566.
247. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994); United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
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that are subject to strict scrutiny.2 48 These restrictions must be narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest and be the least restrictive
means available to further the articulated interest.249
The state might have a compelling interest to preserve the liberties
of civilians, including in cyberspace. Such disclosure of personal
information could violate a basic human right, strip them of their
dignity, cause emotional distress, and socially and professionally harm
or alienate them.250 Thus, as the proposal serves a compelling state
interest, it must not be under-inclusive, nor over-inclusive, to survive
strict scrutiny.2"5' For the framework to avoid under-inclusiveness, it
must not be applied only upon the speech. For the framework to avoid
over-inclusiveness, its coverage should not apply to data that does not
Generally, the right to be
advance legitimate governmental objectives. 252
scrutiny.
strict
pass
likely
not
would
forgotten
The most proper solution for information theft is a combination of
legal and technological measures. On the technological aspect, while
recognizing the drawbacks of such a move, we need to make sure that
each bulk of data is easily traceable.2 53 For example, we should make
sure that all emails have a digital fingerprint, and that in a simple act,
OSPs could locate them and quickly remove them. Now the legal part:
first, the law must set initial technological standards for data held by any
248. See, e.g., Sable Commc'ns v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (holding that contentrestrictions must promote a compelling government interest and that it must be the least restrictive
means of achieving that interest); Patrick M. Garry, A New FirstAmendment Model for Evaluating
Content-Based Regulation of Internet Pornography: Revising the Strict Scrutiny Model to Better
Reflect the Realities of the Modern Media Age, 2007 BYU L. REv. 1595, 1596 (arguing that First
Amendment doctrine requires that any content-based speech regulation is subject to strict scrutiny
by the courts). For more on strict scrutiny in the United States, see generally Adam Winkler, Fatal
in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59
VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006).
249. See, e.g., Ashcrofl v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660, 665, 673 (2004) (finding that the Child
Online Protection Act ("COPA"), designed to regulate minor's access to harmful material on the
Intemet, is unconstitutional because it "was likely to burden some speech that is protected for
adults" while there were "plausible, less restrictive alternatives"); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,
849, 871-72, 875, 885 (1997) (finding that two provisions of the Communications Decency Act of
1996, indecent transmission and patently offensive display, abridge freedom of speech and are
therefore, unconstitutional); Sable Commc'ns, 492 U.S. at 126 (holding that the government may
"regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest
if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest").
250. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Information Privacy, and the Troubling
Implications of a Right to Stop People Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1049, 1110 (2000).
251. Seeid atl116-17.
252. See generally Robert Kirk Walker, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 257
(2012) (arguing that only a limited form of a right to be forgotten could be compatible with the
U.S. Constitution).
253. Such a move is problematic to some extent, as digital fingerprints will eliminate
anonymity over the Internet. See Crump, supra note 230, at 216.
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OSP. If the data is not quickly identifiable and searchable, it cannot be
retained. Second, much like stealing in the kinetic world, civilians that
are aware that their information was stolen could file an online
complaint at a designated law enforcement agency. Third, the agency
will review the complaint, with transparent judicial review available, to
decide whether the data was obtained unlawfully. If so, the agency or the
court could order OSPs to remove any content linked to the theft.
Aside from costs, this proposition could be problematic in other
regards. It grants censorship powers to enforcement and judicial entities
that might be misused. Free speech, for that matter, is endangered here.
But whether or not it will pass strict scrutiny, we should change our
perception of data and, much like the kinetic world, allow for remedies
when it is stolen. Such remedies should not only be limited to
intellectual property, but any stolen information. This is why technology
is important. The legal system should only locate data that was stolen
and "return" it to its rightful owner.
Surely, this new liberty will not solve the problem completely. Not
every civilian will be able to locate the data, and even if she does, it
could be too late. Moreover, not every civilian will be able to fully enjoy
such liberty. When data is viral, there is not much to do to stop its
dissemination. Take recent issues involving celebrities for example. In
2008, Erin Andrews (an American sportscaster) was filmed in different
hotel rooms through the peepholes. 4 One of the videos, in which she
appeared nude, was posted online in 2009.255 The filmmaker, Michael
David Barrett, was arrested that year; he pled guilty and was sentenced
to thirty months in prison followed by three years of probation, and he
was charged $5000 in fines and ordered to pay $7366 in restitution. 6
Andrews also sued the hotels in which she stayed for negligence and
invasion of privacy. 257 The video? It is still available online. 258 Andrews
cannot remove it, as she is not the copyright owner.
Another example occurred in late 2014, when Oscar-winning
actress Jennifer Lawrence discovered that her nude photos were leaked
254. See Abigail Pesta, The Haunting of Erin Andrews, MARIE CLAIRE (July 13, 2011),
http://www.marieclaire.com/celebrity-lifestyle/celebrities/erin-andrews-interview.
255. Id.
256. Associated Press, Andrews' Stalker Gets 2 2 Years in Prison, ESPN (Mar. 15, 2010),
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/news/story?id=4998324.
257. CNN Wire Staff, ESPN's Andrews Files Invasion of Privacy Suit over Hotel Incident,
CNN (Dec. 6, 2011, 6:19 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/12/06/us/erin-andrews-lawsuit.
258. A Google video search of "Erin Andrews Nude" still results in over 150,000 hits. Search
of "Erin Andrews Nude," GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/webhp?sourceid=chromeinstant&ion=l&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#safe=off&tbm=vid&q=erin+andrews+nude (last visited Nov.
22, 2015).
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online.2 59 She was among many other celebrities, mostly women, whose
accounts were hacked and their private pictures posted online.26 ° Unlike
the Andrews case, this was a result of cyber-attack on Apple's cloud
services suite, iCloud.261 But the distinction should make no difference.
In both cases, the result is that someone acted unlawfully and harmed
another individual by posting materials online. Unlike Andrews,
however, Lawrence is the copyright holder of the nude photos, or at least
of most of them. Presumably, she can make use of copyright law to
remove the images. But as you might have guessed, those photos are still
available online. Even if Google removes links to the pictures, or forces
websites to remove the content, end-users who have saved the images
will still possess the ability to transfer the files among themselves. Thus,
even existing "removal" policies set by the DMCA have proven to be
insufficient mechanisms to stop viral data, and unfortunately, my
proposed solution will not be different. Nevertheless, the scenario I deal
with in this Article is different. Our emails typically do not go viral,
unless we are well known. Therefore, using legal mechanisms could
actually stop the dissemination of such information, or at least
substantially reduce its accessibility. It may not be a perfect solution to
eradicating the unauthorized dissemination of personal information, but
the proposal would be better than current U.S. policies and vital for
securing our online liberties.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Internet plays an integral role in our daily life. We need to feel
safe when we use it for our various activities. It is an important liberty in
any democratic society. But cyber-warfare endangers such liberty. As
the Sony Hack showed, the data of even unknown individuals could one
day be published online, viewable and searchable by all. Thus, if the
Sony Hack truly marks a new paradigm of cyber-attacks, then we should
rethink how to better secure civilians. As this Article showed, a possible
solution could be a digital fingerprint requirement under a new legal
framework.262 Under this framework, when someone steals your data,
you could file a complaint online with a designated U.S. law
enforcement agency, which, along with accompanying judicial review,

259. Kelli Bender, Lena Dunham, Emma Watson, and More Celebrities React to Jennifer
Lawrence Nude Photo Hack, PEOPLE (Sept. 2, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://www.people.com/article/
twitter-reactions-jennifer-lawrence-nude-photo-leak.
260. Id.
261. See Raven & Wilson, supra note 90.
262. See supra Part V.B.
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could order OSPs to remove the content and any links to such content.263
While this is not a perfect solution, it is much better than current U.S.
law or the EU's right to be forgotten.
The new threats to civilians online demonstrate how the rules of
cyber-warfare might be changing. Civilians now play a major role in the
digital battlefield, both as attackers and targets. Until now, although
sometimes it has caused inconveniences and perhaps been harmful to
some extent, cyber-warfare has not lived up to its destructive potential.
U.S. critical infrastructure has not been affected yet. More broadly,
states, companies, and individuals might have suffered some harm and
inconvenience due to cyber-attacks, but to date, it has been nevertheless
negligible. The new role of civilians might change this, however. As
more civilians enter the battlefield, from both ends, cyber-warfare could
lead to destructive outcomes-an equivalent of a civil war in
cyberspace. We ought to reduce this possibility using legal and
technological measures to ensure the liberties of civilians to safely
explore the digital realm, because if civilians do not feel safe, digital
riots could ensue.

263.

See supra Part V.B.
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